Introduction
In real-world negotiations, the parties sometimes experience long, costly delays before reaching an agreement. In wage bargaining, the workers may strike or slow down the work before getting a new contract. The litigants may pay large sums in legal fees before reaching a settlement, and they may even end up in court. For example, Princeton University spent more than 40 million dollars in its legal defense against the Robertson family before reaching a settlement in 2008. More generally, in a large dataset on malpractice insurance cases, Watanabe (2006) …nds that the settlement is delayed 1.7 years on average. Legislators may not be able to pass a necessary bill, such as a health-care reform bill, for decades. And wars may cause the death of thousands of people and scar generations while their leaders negotiate a peace agreement.
A prominent explanation for such costly delays is the parties'excessive optimism about their bargaining power in the future (Hicks (1932) , Farber and Katz (1979) , Shavell (1982) ).
The argument is simply that when the parties are excessively optimistic about the future, there may not be any agreement that can satisfy all parties'in ‡ated expectations. In that case, there cannot be an agreement that all parties accept, making the delay inevitable. This explanation has been corroborated by a large body of evidence that suggests that optimism and self-serving biases are common (see, for example, Weinstein (1980) ) and that even the seasoned negotiators exhibit these biases (Neale and Bazerman (1985) and Babcock et al. (1995) , Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) ).
While the explanation is compelling and the evidence for optimism is strong, recent studies have established that optimism plays a subtle role in bargaining and that excessive optimism alone may not explain the delays in real-world negotiations. For example, empirically, Farber and Bazerman (1989) argued that excessive optimism cannot explain the …nding that the settlement rates in …nal-o¤er arbitration are higher than the settlement rates in conventional Key words and phrases. Heterogeneous Priors, Optimism, Self-serving Biases, Bargaining, Delay.
I thank Charles Manski for detailed comments and Anton Tsoy for research assistance. 1 arbitration. Theoretically, Yildiz (2003) introduces a bargaining model in which the players may be optimistic about the future bargaining power, which is modeled as the probability of making an o¤er in the future. 1 He shows that when the parties are to remain su¢ ciently optimistic for a su¢ ciently long future they must reach an immediate agreement in any subgame-perfect equilibrium. Hence, optimism alone cannot explain the delays observed in negotiations. Therefore, one needs a more careful analysis in order to understand the role of belief di¤erences, such as optimism and pessimism, in bargaining.
Recently several authors have carefully examined the role of optimism in bargaining, analyzing dynamic models of bargaining in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power. In this study, I present the main …ndings of this literature. The rest of the introduction is devoted to a summary of these …ndings.
When there is a nearby deadline, the settlement is delayed to the last minute before the deadline. This deadline e¤ect is commonly observed in real-world negotiations as well as in laboratory experiments (see Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988) and the references therein). The …rst main …nding is that the deadline e¤ect naturally occurs in equilibrium of bargaining models with optimistic players (Simsek and Yildiz (2007) ). The rationale is as follows. The cost of delay at the deadline is quite high, as the players cannot reach an agreement afterwards. Hence, in the last period, there is a wide range of individually rational agreements, and the players'bargaining power has a large impact on the terms of the settlements. Therefore, any optimism about the bargaining power in the last period is translated into a large amount of optimism about the shares at the deadline. In that case, there may not be any decision at the beginning that meets all players'in ‡ated expectations from waiting until the deadline, in which case the players wait until the deadline to settle.
The second main …nding is that when the parties can learn about their bargaining power during the negotiations, optimism may lead to long delays (Yildiz (2004) ). The rationale for delay is as follows. If a Bayesian player i is optimistic about his bargaining power, then he is also optimistic that the information that they receive will vindicate his position.
Hence, if players are expected to learn, an optimistic player i is also optimistic that the other player j will learn that i has a strong position in their bargaining and thereby be 1 As it will be demonstrated in Section 3, in sequential bargaining without outside options, the players' equilibrium payo¤s are equal to the discounted present value of all gains from trade at times when they make an o¤er in the future. Hence, in such a model, making an o¤er is the only sorce of bargaining power. In general, a player can get his bargaining power from many di¤erent sources, such as his outside options, his patience, and his ability to sway outside parties. While many of such factors can be modeled within sequential bargaining by considering a suitable stochastic process that determines the proposer at each instance, I will be agnostic about the source of bargaining power in this introduction.
persuaded to agree to i's terms. Hence, at the beginning of the negotiation when the players learn relatively quickly, each player waits in the hopes that the other player will learn and be persuaded to a reasonable agreement. As time passes, the learning slows down, and it becomes no longer worthwhile to wait for the other parties'learning. That is when they reach an agreement. This rationale for delay has been established in Yildiz (2004) in an abstract model of bargaining. The idea has been successfully applied in more applied models, such as pretrial negotiations (Watanabe (2006) ), negotiation with optimism about the market conditions (Thanassoulis (2010)), and cross-license agreements (Galasso (2006) ).
Note that the delay generated in this literature is signi…cantly di¤erent from the delay due to incomplete information. First, the delay here is certain. Under the deadline e¤ect, it is common knowledge at the beginning that the players settle only just before the deadline.
Under learning, it is again common knowledge that the players will wait until t to settle. In contrast, in incomplete-information models, the delay is only a possibility; typically, there is a type that reaches an agreement immediately. Second, the delay here can be quite costly.
Under the deadline e¤ect, the players may lose approximately half of the pie in waiting.
Under learning, they may lose approximately 17% of the pie in waiting.
The third …nding is that when the optimism is persistent, the delay is short in the following sense. Under persistent optimism (without learning and deadlines), many results conclude that there must be an immediate agreement. Even in the studies that establish ine¢ cient delays without learning and deadlines (such as Ali (2006) and Ortner (2010) ), the amount of delay goes to zero in the continuous-time limit. 2 The rationale for this is as follows. When players are optimistic about the future, the range of individually rational agreements is quite narrow. Hence, the players'bargaining power does not have a large impact on the outcome.
(It does not a¤ect the outcome in cases of disagreement, and it has a small impact when there is an agreement.) Therefore, the players' optimism about their bargaining power is not fully translated into optimism about their shares in the future. In equilibrium, their optimism about the future shares becomes so small that the players reach an agreement relatively quickly-if not immediately.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I present a static model of optimism. In this model, I present the traditional excessive-optimism explanation for disagreement and some important static applications. In Section 3, I present a dynamic model of bargaining with optimism. In Section 4, I present the deadline e¤ect. In Section 5, 2 This is partly due to the fact that in such a limit the bargaining power becomes extremely transient (see Simsek and Yildiz (2007) Thanassoulis (2010) . In Section 9, I discuss the modeling assumptions and possible directions for future studies. Section 10 concludes.
Static Model
In this section, I present a simple static model of bargaining as in Nash (1950) Let N = f1; 2g be the set of players. The players want to make a joint decision. Let U be the set of all feasible expected utility pairs resulting from the joint decisions, and assume that U is compact and convex. If the players disagree, then the players' payo¤ vector is
), which is unknown. Each player has a subjective belief about x d , and these beliefs may di¤er from each other. Write E i for the expectation operator according to player i. Write also
2 ) for the expected disagreement payo¤ vector. Note that for each player i we take his own expectation of his continuation payo¤ as the expected disagreement payo¤ for player i. Example 1. In a pre-trial negotiation, one can take players 1 and 2 as the plainti¤ and the defendant, respectively. The players negotiate a settlement s, which is paid to the plainti¤ by the defendant. If they cannot settle, a judge (or an arbitrator) orders the defendant pay J to the plainti¤, and players incur litigation costs. Here, J is usually referred to as the judgement. In this model,
where u i is the von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of player i and S is the set of possible settlement amounts. When the players are risk-neutral, u i (x) = x for each x. The disagreement payo¤s are
where c i is the litigation cost for player i.
The contract zone is de…ned as the set
of all decisions that is at least as good as disagreement. This set is called the contract zone because the payo¤ vector from an agreement has to be in this set, as agreement requires the consent of both players. Following Nash (1950) , the traditional models assume that the contract zone is non-empty. In that case, assuming no bargaining friction exists, one can conclude that players reach an agreement, which results in a payo¤ vector in the contract zone.
The contract zone may be empty in the model with heterogeneous beliefs. There may not be a decision that meets both players'expectations from disagreement even if the disagreement outcome x d is dominated by some decision for every possible realization. This may happen when the parties'optimism about their disagreement payo¤s o¤sets the costs associated with disagreement.
Example 2. In the previous example, assume that the players are risk neutral. Suppose that the judgement isĴ if the judge …nds the defendant guilty and 0 otherwise. Because of the litigation costs, the outcome in each case is dominated by a settlement. The disagreement outcome (Ĵ c 1 ; Ĵ c 2 ) in case of guilt is dominated by settlementĴ, and the disagreement outcome ( c 1 ; c 2 ) without guilt is dominated by settlement 0. Nevertheless, the contract zone may be empty. To see this, let p i be the probability the player i assigns to the event that the judge …nds the defendant guilty. The disagreement payo¤ vector is
In this example, the players' optimism is measured by p 1 p 2 , the amount by which the plainti¤ overestimates the likelihood of guilt according to the defendant. The contract zone is empty if and only if
i.e.., the optimism exceeds the normalized cost of delay.
As the last example shows, when players are excessively optimistic (e.g., when p 1 p 2 exceeds (c 1 + c 2 ) =Ĵ), the contract zone may be empty, and there cannot be any decision that can meet both players'in ‡ated expectations. In that case the players necessarily disagree. This is the essence of the usual excessive-optimism explanation for disagreement in bargaining. This idea has been explored by Farber and Katz (1979) , Shavell (1982) and Priest and Kline (1984) . Note that disagreement simply follows from individual rationality and does not depend on the details of negotiation rules. 3 Note that in this model the disagreement occurs only when it is Pareto-e¢ cient. For otherwise the contract zone would not be empty. Therefore, although the parties agree that the disagreement is costly, given the parties'di¤ering expectations, the outcome is the best plan they could come up with. It is tempting to generalize this …nding to all bargaining models with optimism. It turns out that in dynamic models with optimism the delay can be highly Pareto-ine¢ cient (see Remark 2 in Section 4).
Whether there is a disagreement crucially depends on the expected disagreement payo¤ d, which in turn is a¤ected by the players'attitudes towards risk and the dispute-resolution mechanism used in case of disagreement. Farber and Katz (1979) analyze the role of riskaversion. If the main uncertainty is about the way the judge or the arbitrator will rule in court, risk aversion decreases d without a¤ecting the set U . That enlarges the contract zone and increases the settlement rate.
Much of the literature explores how agreement is a¤ected by the role of di¤erent aspects of the legal system. For example, Shavell (1982) focuses on the allocation of legal costs, while Farber and Bazerman (1989) investigates the arbitration mechanism, comparing the …nal-o¤er arbitration, in which the arbitrator has to choose one of the o¤ers submitted by the parties, to the conventional arbitration, in which the arbitrator can choose any decision. Empirically, the settlement rate is higher under …nal-o¤er arbitration, and Farber and Bazerman (1989) argue that the optimism alone cannot explain this fact.
More recently, Andreoni and Mado¤ (2007) show theoretically and experimentally that winner-take-all rules magnify the e¤ects of optimism and diminish the likelihood of settling relative to judicial discretion.
Example 3 (Andreoni and Mado¤ (2007)). The system in Example 2 is a winner-take-all.
In that case, as we have seen, the contract zone is empty if and only if
Suppose now that the judge assigns probability on guilt and decides guilty if and only if > 1=2. Let i be the probability density of according to player i, so that p i = R 1 1=2 i ( ) d . In accordance with optimism, assume that 1 ( ) < 2 ( ) for < 1=2 and 1 ( ) > 2 ( ) for > 1=2. Now consider a discretionary system in which the judge decides the judgement amount J rather than simply the guilt. In particular, he sets J = Ĵ . This system allows for judicial discretion. Then, the contract zone is empty if and only if
But one can easily check that
Therefore, disagreement arises under the winner-take-all system whenever there is a disagreement under judicial discretion.
The above examples consider settlements that end the disputes, by transferring money from the defendant to the plainti¤. In practice, the negotiators sometimes choose a settlement that modi…es the jury award, rather than settling the case. The settlement stipulates a high payment if the defendant is found guilty and a low payment if the defendant is found not guilty. Such high-low contracts seem counterintuitive as the parties go through costly litigation despite reaching an agreement. Prescott, Spier, and Yoon (2010) show that such high-low contracts can be optimal for risk-averse but optimistic players. Going to court allows them to bet on the outcome of the trial, utilizing the di¤ering beliefs about the court decision, while bounding the payment by a contract insures the risk-averse parties against the extreme jury awards.
The static model here provides useful insights into the behavior of optimistic negotiators without compromising on tractability. It is also appropriate in pretrial negotiations in which the optimism is about a …nal decision in the court. Nevertheless, its reduced form does not allow one to investigate dynamic issues, such as the time of settlement and learning. More 5 Indeed,
where the …rst inequality is by the assumption that 1 ( ) < 2 ( ) for < 1=2.
importantly, its insights may be misleading when the optimism is not about a decision by a judge but it is about the players'future bargaining power more broadly. In the remainder of the paper, I will review the studies that carefully explore the role of optimism in dynamic models.
Basic Dynamic Model
Rubinstein (1982) and Stahl (1971) have introduced a sequential bargaining model, which has been used as the canonical model of bargaining throughout economics. 6 Yildiz (2003) extends the Rubinstein-Stahl framework by allowing the players to be optimistic about their bargaining power in the future, where the bargaining power is measured by the probability of making an o¤er. Variations of the extended model have been used in the studies that I will review in the sequel. In this section, I will present the extended model.
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Two risk-neutral players want to divide a dollar. The players can strike a deal at dates in the set T = ft 2 N j t < tg for some t 1. 8 Write N = f1; 2g for the set of players and
for the set of all feasible expected utility pairs.
Consider the following perfect-information game. At each t 2 T , Nature recognizes a player i 2 N ; i o¤ers an alternative u = (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 U ; if the other player accepts the o¤er, then the game ends yielding a payo¤ vector t u = ( t u 1 ; t u 2 ) for some 2 (0; 1); otherwise, the game proceeds to date t + 1, except for t = t 1, when the game ends. If no o¤er is accepted, then each gets 0. Write = ( t ) t2T for the recognition process, where t is the player who is recognized at date t. Write also t 2 N t for a generic history of the recognized players before date t (i.e., on f0; 1; : : : ; t 1g). The players have heterogeneous beliefs about the recognition process. Write p i t ( s ) for the probability player i assigns to the event that i will be recognized at date t given the history s 2 N s with s t. Note that the recognition process is a stochastic process, in that each t is a random variable, de…ned over a state space. The underlying state space is …xed, and there are two possibly distinct probability distributions on the state space, one for each player.
The only departure from the framework of Rubinstein (1982) and Stahl (1971) is that there are two sets of beliefs, one for each player, and these beliefs may di¤er. In this model, as in Rubinstein-Stahl framework, the continuation value of a player can be written as the present value of the rents that he expects to extract when he is recognized in the future.
Unlike in the Rubinstein-Stahl framework, the players here may be optimistic about their recognition in the future. Write
for the level of optimism for t at s . Note that y t ( s ) measures precisely how much a player j overestimates the probability of the event that j is recognized at date t according to the other player i. Indeed, according to i, the probability of that event is only 1 p
The di¤erence is y t ( s ). The players are said to be optimistic for t at s if y t ( s ) 0; they are said to be pessimistic for t at
Continuation values in Equilibrium. For …nite t, the bargaining game here can be (Here, continuation value at t is measured in terms of its equivalent dollar amount at t, so that the expected payo¤ is t times the continuation value.) Theorem 1. For any (t; t ; i), there exists a unique V
The proof of this result can be found in Yildiz (2003) . Here, R t ( t ; i) is the cost of delaying agreement one more period at history ( t ; i) under the possibly in ‡ated expectations V 1 t+1 and V 2 t+1 from the future. When the cost is positive, they reach an agreement, and the proposer extracts the entire cost, as he is making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. When 1
it is not possible to meet both parties'in ‡ated expectation, and they disagree. Note that the responder is indi¤erent between agreement and delay. Hence, the continuation value of player i at the beginning of t is as in the di¤erence equation (3.1): he expects that, in addition to V parties'actual bargaining power using the tools of game theory. As in Nash (1950) , at each instance, each player has some relative bargaining power, which is de…ned as the share he would get from the gain from trade if they were to strike a deal at that moment. In light of (3.1), one models such a relative bargaining power by probability of making an o¤er at that moment. The bargaining power itself is determined by the forces on the ground. As the situation changes, the bargaining power changes, leading to a stochastic process (see Simsek and Yildiz (2007)).
Agreement and Disagreement Regimes in Equilibrium. I now describe the equilibrium behavior in a greater detail. There are two cases. The …rst one, namely the disagreement regime, is characterized by the inequality
In that case, the players do not reach an agreement at history ( t ; i). Indeed, if they do not agree at ( t ; i), then the continuation value of each player k at t + 1 will be V k t+1 ( t ; i).
In order for player k to agree on a division (u 1 ; u 2 ) of the dollar at t, he must be given at
Since an agreement requires the approval of both parties, this requires
Since there is only one dollar and S t+1 ( t ; i) > 1, such u is not feasible. In other words, when S t+1 ( t ; i) > 1, it is not possible to meet both parties' in ‡ated expectations from the future, and the players cannot reach an agreement at history ( t ; i). In that case, when player i is recognized at the beginning of t, players anticipate that there will be no agreement at t, and each player's continuation value is the present value of waiting until date t + 1.
The available rent for the proposer is 0.
The second case is called the agreement regime, and characterized by the inequality
In that case, if they have not yet reached an agreement, the players agree at history ( t ; i)
on a division that gives 1 V j t+1 ( t ; i) to the proposer i, leaving the other player j his continuation value V j t+1 ( t ; i). Note that the proposer gets more than his continuation value V i t+1 ( t ; i) from delaying the agreement one more period. The di¤erence,
is the rent for the proposer.
Bargaining Delays under a Deadline-Deadline Effect
In this section, I take the deadline t …nite and show that, when he players are su¢ ciently optimistic about their bargaining power at t 1, they wait until t 1 to reach an agreement.
I then discuss a couple of basic properties of bargaining delays caused by optimism.
In real-world negotiations with a deadline, the agreement is often delayed until the very last minute before the deadline. This behavior is called the deadline e¤ect. It is so common in real-world negotiations that there are multiple names for such agreements, such as eleventhhour agreement and settlement on the courthouse steps. It is also commonly observed in laboratory experiments (see Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988) and the references therein). The next result shows that the deadline e¤ect naturally arises under optimism.
Theorem 2 (Simsek and Yildiz (2007)). Assume that t is …nite. If
then, in equilibrium, the players disagree at each t < t 1 and reach an agreement at t 1.
Proof. After the deadline, the players automatically receive zero: V t = 0. Hence, at t 1, they reach an agreement in which the proposer gets everything. At any date t < t 1, this leads to a disagreement. Indeed, at any history ( 0 ; : : : ; t ), since a player i can wait until ( 0 ; : : : ; t ), while the threshold (1 t 1 t )= t 1 t is the normalized cost of delaying the agreement from t to t 1. Theorem 2 establishes that when the parties' optimism y t 1 about their bargaining power in the last period exceeds the cost, they wait until the very last period before the deadline to settle.
This result provides a simple rationale for the deadline e¤ect. Since the players cannot reach an agreement after the deadline, the cost of delay is very large just before the deadline.
Indeed, any division is individually rational. Hence, at t 1, the players'bargaining power has a large impact on the terms of agreement, and the players'optimism about their bargaining power is directly translated into optimism about their shares. If the players are su¢ ciently optimistic about their bargaining power at t 1, they become so optimistic about their shares at t 1 that no agreement can meet their expectations from waiting until t 1. This results in the behavior described by the deadline e¤ect.
In a model with durable bargaining power and stochastic deadlines, Simsek and Yildiz (2007) show that the strength of the deadline e¤ect is increasing in optimism and the "durability"of bargaining power and decreasing in the amount of the uncertainty regarding of the arrival of deadline.
Theorem 2 exhibits some remarkable properties of delay under optimism. I will next discuss these properties and compare the delay here to the delay in usual models of bargaining.
Remark 1 (Delay is common knowledge). In Theorem 2, it is common knowledge at the beginning that the players will not be able to reach an agreement before the last period. Despite this, they cannot reach an agreement because each player hopes that if they wait until the last period he will be vindicated and get a very good deal that will compensate him for the costs he incurs. In contrast, delay in bargaining models with incomplete information is only a possibility. In those models, there is often a type that reaches an agreement immediately.
The delay in Theorem 2 is typically ine¢ cient, as illustrated in the following simple case. the players wait until t = 1 and the proposer at t = 1 gets the entire dollar. In expectation, this contract gives each player p 1 , while each player gets only t 1 p t 1 in equilibrium. The contract Pareto-dominates the equilibrium outcome whenever p 1 > t 2 p t 1 , a condition that is easily satis…ed when t is large.
Example 4 (Delay is ine¢ cient
Remark 2 (Delay is ine¢ cient). Example 4 illustrates the general fact that the delay in dynamic bargaining models with optimism is typically Pareto-ine¢ cient. In contrast, in the static model of Section 2, the disagreement occurs only when it is e¢ cient. Likewise, in sequential bargaining models with complete information, delay arises in a Markov-perfect equilibrium only when it is Pareto e¢ cient to wait; the only form of ine¢ ciency in such a model is the lack of su¢ cient delay (Merlo and Wilson (1995) ).
Immediate Agreement with No Learning
When there is a nearby deadline, the optimistic players may delay the agreement to the very last period. Yildiz (2003) shows that if players are to remain optimistic for a su¢ ciently long future, then in equilibrium they reach an agreement immediately. I maintain the following assumption, which states that players do not learn about the future recognitions as they observe which player gets to make an o¤er and when.
Assumption IND. The players perceive the recognition process to be independently dis-
Under this assumption, p, y, V , S, and R are all deterministic. Hence, whether there is an agreement regime at a given date does not depend on the history. This simpli…es the analysis dramatically.
In any disagreement regime, by (3.1), V t = V t+1 , and hence S t = S t+1 . Since S t+1 2, this implies that an interval of disagreement regimes can be at most as long as
, yielding a uniform bound on possible delays. Note that the delay can be quite large: nearly half of the pie can be lost during the delay.
In any agreement regime, (3.1) becomes
, where R t = 1 S t+1 . Adding this equation up for players yields (5.1)
This equation gives the main relation between the relative bargaining powers and the bargaining shares. It states that the discrepancy S t 1 between the perceived size of the pie and the actual size is proportional to the level y t of optimism and to the rent R t = 1 S t+1 at t. When S t+1 is small, the rent R t is large. In that case, the range of individually rational trades is large. The players'relative bargaining powers then a¤ect the shares signi…cantly, as the shares can vary as much as 1 S t+1 . Then, the optimism y t about the bargaining power is translated to the signi…cant amounts of optimism about the shares, namely y t R t .
Consequently, y t R t may be so large that S t becomes larger than 1, causing a delay at t 1.
On the other hand, when S t+1 is large, the rent R t is small, allowing a narrow range of possible individually-rational trades. In that case, the bargaining power does not have a large impact on the shares at t. In that case, the level of optimism y t about the bargaining power is translated to optimism about shares with multiplication by R t , scaling down the amount of optimism about the shares signi…cantly. Based on the above equation, the following lemma provides the main step. Lemma 1 can be spelled out as follows. Consider a date t at which the players are expected to reach an agreement (i.e., S t+1 1= ), but the expectations from the future are relatively high: S t+1 1. Lemma 1 …rst establishes that, since the expectations are high, the rent for the proposer is so low that the players prefer agreeing at t 1 to getting this rent at t. That is, S t 1= . Secondly, the lemma establishes that, since the players are optimistic for t, their expectations about their shares at t are high: S t 1. This, of course, in turn leaves a small rent at t 1, so small that the prospect of getting the rent does not entice the players to delay the agreement at t 2. Iterative application of Lemma 1 then yields the following immediate-agreement theorem, which is the main result in Yildiz (2003) . showing that there is an agreement regime at each t t .
The main idea of Theorem 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 . There may be an interval of disagreement regimes near the end of the game. Nevertheless, in such periods of disagreement, the players anticipate that they will not be able to reach an agreement, and hence their bargaining power does not have any value. If the anticipated delay is too long, then they would rather reach an agreement than commence a long delay, even if each player expects a high share at the end. This results in a uniform bound L( ) on the length of such an interval of disagreement regimes. Now consider the day t just before the delay starts. Starting from the next day, the players are so optimistic that they would rather go through a long delay than reach an agreement, i.e., S t+2 > 1= . Then, they must still have high expectations from future at t, even if their expectations are not so high that they wait. Indeed,
In that case, the range of individually-rational agreements is small, and
Agreement Disagreement It is crucial for this result that the optimism is persistent. As in Theorem 2, if the level of optimism drops suddenly at some t , then the players may wait until t to settle. (For example, if y t = 1 for all t > t , each player thinks that he will not make an o¤er after t and behaves as if there is a deadline at t .) Yildiz (2003) shows that if there are no sharp declines in the level of optimism, there is an immediate agreement.
Ortner (2009) extends the optimism model in this section by allowing the size of the pie to be stochastic as in Merlo and Wilson (1995) . He shows that the unique, subgame-perfect equilibrium may involve ine¢ cient delays. He further shows that as the time delay between two consequent o¤ers goes to zero, the length of delay goes to zero.
The immediate-agreement results here are not meant to refute the role of optimism in bargaining delays. They are meant to refute the naive idea that the agreement is delayed simply when the optimism is excessive. They illustrate that optimism alone cannot cause a delay. Whether it causes a delay depends on the details of how optimism varies with time and how it interacts with other factors, such as a deadline (or learning as we will see later).
Therefore, if one wishes to understand the role of optimism in bargaining, he must carry out a careful analysis. His analysis must be more careful than the analysis of usual models because there is little received experience about the models with heterogeneous priors.
Multilateral Bargaining-Waiting to Settle
This section presents the main result of Ali (2006) : in multilateral bargaining there may be some delay even under constant level of optimism because the backward induction process becomes unstable. I will also brie ‡y present the main idea of a result by Galasso (2010) that establishes that in multilateral bargaining, optimism may increase or decrease the amount of delay depending on which aspect of bargaining power the player is optimistic about.
Take n 3 players, and assume that the level of optimism is constant:
for some y > 0. In order to avoid the "folk-theorem style"multiple equilibria in multilateral bargaining, Ali (2006) focuses on the …nite-horizon case.
Consider a date t with agreement regime:
The recognized player o¤ers the other players their continuation values and keeps the rest for himself. Therefore, as in the previous section,
The backwards-di¤erence equation is stable if and only if j yj < 1= . By de…nition, y n 1:
For n = 2, as in the previous section, this implies that y < 1= . In that case, S is a contraction mapping (backwards) and has an absorbing region with agreement. On the other hand, when n > 2 and is large, one can have
In that case, S is exploding. De…ne S = (1 + y)=(1 + y) 2 (1; 1= ) as the …xed point of the above equation, so that
When stable ( y 2 ( 1; 1)), S t converges to S. But when y > 1, S t goes away from S in the backward induction. Hence, unless S t = S, which happens only in knife-edge cases, S t eventually goes outside of the agreement region, becoming S t > 1. In that case, there is a disagreement at t 1. (2006) The dynamics in the disagreement regions remains as before:
Backward induction eventually takes players back to the agreement regime, where the unstable process starts all over again. Figure 2 illustrates the behavior under y > 1= . There are periods that are "ripe for a settlement."These periods are separated by periods in which the players necessarily disagree.
In the latter period, the players wait to settle in the next time where agreement is possible.
The following result must be clear from the previous discussion: Theorem 4 (Ali (2006)). Assume that y > 1. Then, for eacht, there exists t >t such that there is a disagreement regime at t = 0.
The ine¢ ciency caused by the delay described in the previous result goes to zero as ! 1,
showing that the delay is much shorter than the one caused by a transient optimism, where half of the pie may disappear due to the delay. To see this, note that S t+1 1. Hence,
Therefore, the length of any delay is uniformly bounded bỹ L( ; y) = log(1 + y(1 )) log(1= ) :
The above …nding appears to be quite general. Several other results, such as the results of 
Example 5 (Galasso (2010)).
A …rm is considering opening a factory in one of the two neighboring cities i 2 f1; 2g. The value of the factory is 1 for the city in which it is located and in the neighboring city. The …rm is negotiating the amount of municipal concession p it gets from the city where the factory will be located. The payo¤s of the …rm and the city are p and 1 p, respectively. There are only two periods. In the …rst period, the …rm makes an o¤er to City 1. The …rm …nds it equally likely that it will negotiate with any of the cities in the second period and assigns probability 1=2 to making an o¤er at that period.
Each city assigns probability b for being approached in the second period and probability q for making an o¤er if approached. Note that b measures the optimism about the future trade opportunities, while q measures the optimism about the future bargaining power. In the second period, the proposer gets the entire gain from trade. Hence, at the end of the …rst period, the continuation value of the …rm is =2, and the continuation value of City 1 is (bq + (1 b) ).
Hence, the agreement is delayed if
Optimism q about future bargaining power always contributes towards a delay. When = 0, optimism b about the future trade opportunities also contributes towards a delay. When > q, however, optimism b about the future trade opportunities actually helps avoiding delay.
In a general dynamic model of negotiation, Galasso (2010) shows that the result in this example holds more generally, and the optimism about future trading opportunities may shorten the delay while optimism about the future bargaining power in terms of making an o¤er weakly increases the delay.
Learning under Optimism-Waiting to Persuade
Many of the results above have established that optimism alone cannot explain the bargaining delays. In a tractable learning model, Yildiz (2004) shows that there is a predetermined settlement date t such that the players wait until date t to settle. In this section I will present this result and explain the rationale it provides for bargaining delays, a rationale that is based on optimism and learning.
Consider the following simple form for the beliefs. Fix positive integers m 1 , m 2 , and n with 1 m 2 < m 1 n 2. Write (m; t) for the history t (at the beginning of date t) in which player 1 has made m o¤ers and player 2 has made t m o¤ers. Assume that, for any date s with s t, at history (m; t) player i assigns probability
to the event that Player 1 will make an o¤er at date s. This belief structure arises when each player believes that recognition at di¤erent dates are identically and independently distributed with some unknown probability of Player 1 making an o¤er at any date t, and is distributed with a beta distribution with parameters m i and n.
The beliefs p i s (m; t) take the following simple form:
Note that the period t beliefs about the recognition at future period s depend only on t-not s. Hence, optimism is measured at the time the beliefs are held without distinguishing which future recognition these beliefs are about. Write
for the level of optimism at (m; t). Note that
where = m 1 m 2 . Since y t (m) > 0, the players are optimistic at each (m; t).
The level y t of optimism is deterministic, i.e., y t does not depend on m. (I will suppress m whenever a process is deterministic.) Yildiz (2004) shows that this results in deterministic perceived size S t of pie and rent R t = maxf1 S t+1 ; 0g:
Consequently, (3.4) simpli…es to
is the present value of all future rents. The perceived size of the pie is (7.5)
Notice that although S t and t are deterministic, V i t is not deterministic. Indeed, the continuation value of a player i is proportional to the probability p t;i (m) that he assigns to making o¤ers in future dates. This probability is an a¢ ne function of the number of times i has made an o¤er in the past.
The main objective of the analysis is to explore when there is an agreement regime (i.e.
S t 1) and when there is a disagreement regime (i.e. S t > 1). Since S is deterministic, whether there is an agreement regime is a function of time and does not depend on the history. By (7.5), there is an agreement regime at any t 1 2 T if and only if (7.6)
Since both t and D t are deterministic, (7.6) implies that the settlement date t must be deterministic.
The next result, which is the main result of Yildiz (2004) , states this fact and provides upper and lower bounds for the settlement date. 10 Note that the bounds are determined by the speed of learning, which is measured by the decline y t y t+1 in optimism.
Theorem 5 (Yildiz (2004) ). There exists a predetermined date t such that, in equilibrium, players do not agree at any date t < t , and they reach an agreement at t . The settlement date t is common knowledge at the beginning of the game in equilibrium. Moreover,
where
Proof. De…ne t = minft j t+1 D t+1 g. Since both and D are deterministic (i.e.
independent of m), so is t . By (7.6), the players disagree on dates t < t and settle at t .
To derive the lower bound t l , I …rst establish a lower bound for :
To see the inequality, …rst consider a disagreement regime, so that S t+1 > 1. In that case,
where the …rst equality is by (7.4) and by the fact that R t = 0 in a disagreement regime, the second equality is by (7.5) , and the inequality is by S t+1 > 1. Now, consider an agreement regime, i.e., S t+1 1. In that case,
where the …rst equality is by (7.4) and by the fact that R t = 1 S t+1 in an agreement regime, the second equality is by (7.5) , and the inequality is by y t+1 (1 S t+1 ) 0.
The bound (7.7) yields the lower bound t l as follows. Since the speed y t y t+1 of learning is decreasing in time, for any t t l ,
This inequality is equivalent to (1 + y t ) > (1 + y t+1 ). Hence, by (7.7),
showing that there is a disagreement regime at t 1. Therefore, t t l .
The upper bound t u has been derived in Yildiz (2004) . Since the level of optimism goes to zero as t ! 1, Yildiz (2004) observes that there must be agreement regimes after some date, i.e., the set
is non-empty. On P A, by (7.4), t = 1 y t+1 t+1 . Solving this stable di¤erence equation forwards, he obtains an upper bound for on P A:
Comparing the upper bound to D t , he …nds the upper bound maxft u ; 0g to min P A, which cannot be lower than t , by de…nition.
When t > 0, the players know that they will have to wait until t for an agreement, but they cannot do anything to reach an agreement in an earlier date. This is because although the date t is known from the beginning, the players do not know what kind of an agreement they will reach at t . In fact, as we have seen earlier from (7.3), each player's share is roughly proportional to the number of times he will have been recognized by times t . Since each player i is optimistic about his own recognitions, he is then optimistic about his share at t . In summary, player i is hopeful that he will have the bargaining power frequently by the date t and thereby he will persuade the other player j that i will continue to have the bargaining power, persuading j to agree to i's terms.
Theorem 5 provides upper and lower bounds for the settlement date t . Indeed, there cannot be an agreement regime before the lower bound t l and there cannot be a disagreement regime after the upper bound maxft u ; 0g. Both bounds are given by a comparison of the speed of learning, y t y t+1 , to the normalized per-period cost of delay, (1 )= :
As typical in a Bayesian learning model, at the beginning, the learning is fast and optimism drops fast. When the players are patient, i.e., when (1 )= (y t y t+1 )=2, this entices players to wait in the hopes that their opponents learn and agree to their terms.
As time passes, the learning slows down and eventually it becomes too costly to wait for the opponent's learning. In particular, when the speed of learning goes below (1 )= , the marginal cost 1 of waiting exceeds any gain a player expects from the other party's learning, and players reach an agreement. When the marginal gain from learning is equal to the marginal cost of delay, they reach an agreement. The above equalities give upper and lower bounds. Note that the delay here can be highly costly. From the lower bound t l , one can compute that t can be as low exp( 3=16) = 0:83, i.e., 17% of the pie can be lost due to delay.
Theorem 5 establishes that when the players are optimistic and learning, they may try to persuade the other parties to their own terms by letting them receive more information, hoping that the information will vindicate them. This may lead to a long costly delay.
Applications with Learning and Optimism
In the previous section, I considered an abstract model of bargaining power in order to explore the role of optimism and learning in bargaining delays. While this form of bargaining power has a theoretical appeal (as established in Section 3) and may provide direct insights in some applications, 11 in practical applications the bargaining power is determined by the speci…c aspects of the problem. Analyzing the explicit model directly may provide further insights that may not be available in the reduced-form model above. In this section, I will explore two of such applications with learning. First, I will present a theoretical application Figure 3 , the players are optimistic in the area above the diagonal.
As the players negotiate without observing the arrival of a second buyer, each player lowers his probability on the existence of a second buyer and eventually becomes convinced that there is not a second buyer. (See Figure 3 , for the trajectory of beliefs.) Hence, eventually, optimism becomes negligible, and learning slows down. Therefore, the players eventually agree. Thanassoulis (2010) shows that agreement may be delayed if players are initially very optimistic. For example, if the initial beliefs are in the disagreement region in Figure 3 , the agreement is delayed until the beliefs go into the agreement region. 
This is the di¤erential equation that governs the shares in the agreement region. In order to determine the region between the agreement and disagreement regions, note that, intuitively, there would be an agreement regime at t dt if and only if the cost is nonnegative:
Substituting (8.1) into this inequality, one concludes that there is agreement at t dt if and only if
That is, the cost due to discounting exceeds the perceived additional value due to optimism.
The boundary between the agreement and the disagreement regions is obtained when the cost is equal to the perceived additional value:
The boundary is plotted in Figure 3 in bold. Note that, by the last equality, disagreement requires a positive amount of optimism, and hence the disagreement region is above the diagonal. Note also that one may go out of disagreement region if one …xes the buyer's belief and make the seller more optimistic by increasing p S towards 1. This is because in this model the speed of learning is proportional to p(1 p), and such an optimistic seller may learn so slowly that the buyer may just give in. Finally, if the initial beliefs are in the disagreement region, the players wait until their beliefs hit the boundary of the agreement region to agree, and the cost of such a delay may be quite high, as illustrated by Thanassoulis (2010) . respectively, to the event that Plainti¤ wins, where n t is the number of arrivals, m t is the number of times the information points to the Plainti¤, n 0 is the …rmness of the initial beliefs, and m P =n 0 and m D =n 0 are the initial beliefs of the Plainti¤ and the Defendant, respectively.
Note that this di¤ers from the model in Yildiz (2004) only in two ways. First, the beliefs are about the probability of winning directly, rather than making an o¤er, which is an indirect proxy for the bargaining power. Second, information arrives everyday in Yildiz (2004) , while it arrives only stochastically here. Watanabe (2006) shows that, when players do not learn (e.g. with 0 arrival rate), the players either agree in the …rst day or they go to the court (as in Theorems 3 and 2). When they learn they may settle after a delay (as in Theorem 5). For example, the histograms of the actual and the …tted time delay between …ling and the settlement are plotted in Figure 4 . As in this …gure, the model's …tted data mirror the actual data well for the important parameters, such as settlement amount and delay. He also estimates that the players are initially optimistic and learn during the negotiation. Indeed, he estimates that, initially, the mean of Plainti¤'s belief on probability of his winning is 0.9566, while the mean of defendant's belief on probability of plainti¤'s winning is 0.2982.
The frequency of that event is estimated to be 0.4979. Thereby he estimates that, initially, plainti¤s overestimate their winning probability by 92% on average, and the defendants overestimate their own winning probability by 40% on average.
Comments on the Modeling Assumptions
The literature above allows players to have heterogeneous beliefs and assumes that the belief di¤erence is common knowledge. This sharply contrasts with the traditional view that attributes all belief di¤erences to informational di¤erences, an assumption that is known as the Common-Prior Assumption. In this section, I will explain the logic of the methodology the heterogeneous-prior literature employs and explain how the results are expected to change when the common-knowledge assumption is dropped.
Since Harsanyi (1967) and Auman (1976) , economists have con…ned themselves to the realm of the common-prior assumption. Use of this assumption also coincided with the rise of game theory and information economics, perhaps because the common-prior assumption allowed economists to zero in informational issues. In bargaining, starting with the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) , economists developed a general theory of bargaining under complete information and applied the theory to a wide range of economic areas from international economics (Bulow and Rogo¤ (1991) ) to competitive markets (Gale (1986) ). At the same time, they explored the role of incomplete information in bargaining, exploring the implications of screening, signaling, and the war of attrition. 12 In particular, they have shown that signaling and the war of attrition can cause a long delay in reaching agreement, while the delay in screening models becomes negligible in the continuous-time limit as conjectured by Coase (1972) .
Despite its spectacular success, the common-prior assumption has shown to be quite restrictive, both empirically and theoretically. First, empirical and experimental data as well as casual observations suggest that the common-prior assumption is commonly violated, often in a systematic way. For example, Aumann (1976) has proven that under the common-prior assumption, if the beliefs are common-knowledge, then they must be equal. As Aumann Similar self-serving biases have been observed in the context of bargaining and the data suggest that disagreements and bargaining delays are more common in environments with larger room for such biases. 15 Furthermore, the survey results suggest that the seasoned 12 See Kennan and Wilson (1993) for a detailed survey. 13 Ironically, many economists took this result as an evidence for the the common-prior assumption. Note also that Aumann pointed out that such disagreements may be caused by systematic errors in judgement, which can be modeled using heterogenous priors. 14 See Manski (2004) for a detailed discussion of the empirical research on expectations and further empirical evidence for heterogenous expectations. 15 See the partial survey by Babcock and Lowenstein (1997) for the …ndings referred to in this paragraph.
negotiators are also prone to such biases. For example, in a survey of union and schoolboard presidents regarding the salary negotiations for public-school teachers in Pennsylvania, Babcock, Wan, and Loewenstein (1996) …nd a statistically and economically signi…cant level of self-serving bias. More interestingly, it appears that the subjects do recognize that the other people may exhibit such biases and strategically respond to this possibility, although they do not recognize that they themselves would also exhibit such biases. This is precisely the way the players react in a game theoretical model with heterogeneous priors.
Theoretically, the common-prior assumption has several shortcomings. Second, as in most game theoretical applications, future bargaining power is related to a singular event rather than the frequency of certain events in a repeated experiments. In particular, it is often related to the behavior of a speci…c group of people, such as the way a mediator behaves in the negotiation, the way a particular judge rules in a particular case, the way individuals change their demand in ‡uencing the future prices, or the way the public sentiment shifts. For such events, there seems to be ample room for di¤ering opinions that are consistent with the existing data. In such cases it is natural to think that the players entertain di¤ering opinions even when they share the same information. For example, Ehud
Barak and Yasser Arafat could have di¤erent opinions on how a terrorist attack, such as the one on September 11, 2011, would have a¤ected the public sentiments in the United States regarding the Middle East policy of the United States. In that case, it is desirable to explore the implications of such belief di¤erences.
Third, as suggested in the examples above, the beliefs about some outside events, such as the future bargaining power, are sometimes the beliefs about the behavior of some other players that are not explicitly modeled as players in the model. Hence, the common-prior assumption reduces to the assumption that the modeled players hold the same belief about the unmodeled players, as in a Nash equilibrium. This is, of course, quite consistent with the traditional approach in game theory that focuses on equilibria. Nevertheless, today, the game theory is applied to a wide range of situations in which there is no reason to assume an equilibrium, and the theoretical research reveal that the foundations of equilibrium (and the common-prior assumption) are weaker than one might have assumed. Consequently, nonequilibrium analysis, such as rationalizability (Pearce (1985) and Bernheim (1985) ), plays a central role in modern game theory. Allowing heterogeneous beliefs about these outside events corresponds to considering the non-equilibrium solution concepts in the broader game.
This raises a serious concern about the existing literature that allows heterogeneous priors, however. While the literature allows heterogeneous beliefs regarding outside events, including the behavior of the unmodeled players, it uses equilibrium as a solution concept. It is di¢ cult to justify such a dichotomy as a result of learning (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine (2003)).
Moreover, such a dichotomy may be internally inconsistent as one would have expected that the same factors that lead to systematic biases about the unmodeled behavior lead to the same systematic biases towards the behavior modeled by the strategies (Yildiz (2007) ).
Fortunately for the existing literature on the dynamic models of bargaining with optimism, the games they consider are solvable by iterated elimination of conditionally dominated strategies, and the results are robust to introducing heterogeneous priors regarding strategies. The players may only try to get an idea from the results in similar situations, where similarity is clearly a subjective concept. For example, in a tort case, the parties may be able to obtain a very good estimate of the frequency of the times a particular judge sides with the defendant, but this data may not be as useful if the plainti¤ happens to be special in the plainti¤'s own view (e.g. attractive, or disabled, or a minority, where one can add enough attributes to make the data insu¢ cient). When one weakens the assumptions of the merging results to incorporate the realistic situations, however, the merging disappears. First, when the signal space is in…nite, the players'beliefs eventually merges only on a meager 16 set of parameters (Freedman (1965) ). Since the players' general life experiences are about a much broader world in comparison to the speci…c negotiation at hand, this suggests that the players may start the negotiations with heterogeneous priors and learn their bargaining power eventually as the negotiations proceed as in Section 7. Second, when the players learn only from similar situations, the players' similarity notions may a¤ect the resulting beliefs and the resulting behavior may be similar to the equilibrium behavior with heterogeneous priors (see for example Steiner and Stewart (2008) ). Third, although the learning results are robust to the assumptions about relation between the underlying truth and the signals, the agreement results turn out to be quite fragile to these assumptions: for any situation in which the classical merging theorems apply, there is a nearby set of initial beliefs in which the players' beliefs diverge almost surely after learning (Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, Yildiz (2007)). In the nearby case, the players will behave according to a model with heterogeneous priors, rather than the one with common-prior assumption.
The literature I have discussed not only allows heterogeneous priors but also assumes that the players'beliefs are common knowledge. It is hard to verify such common knowledge assumptions, and one would expect to have both heterogeneous priors and incomplete information in actual situations. The rationale for the common knowledge assumption is methodological. Since we have a signi…cant body of knowledge on the impact of incomplete information in bargaining, one assumes away any incomplete information in order to identify the role of heterogeneous priors alone. In particular, since the analysis of bargining models with incomplete information is tedious and the results are not straightforward due to the large multiplicity of equilibria, assuming away incomplete information is necessary if one wants to have a clear insight into the workings of the belief di¤erences in bargaining.
Incorporating incomplete information to the analysis of bargaining under heterogeneous priors seems to be an important direction for further research. In particular, since optimistic and …rm beliefs are bene…cial for the player in equilibrium, one expects that when one drops the assumption that the beliefs are common knowledge, the players try to form a reputation for having optimistic and …rm beliefs, leading to signaling and screening in equilibrium. One must, however, note that the resulting lessons will remain to be speci…c to the example one considers (regardless of the presence of heterogeneous priors). This is because the equilibrium behavior in sequential equilibrium is highly sensitive to the common knowledge assumptions and higher-order beliefs (i.e. the beliefs about beliefs about . . . beliefs about the underlying 16 A set is said to be meager or Category 1 if it is countable union of nowhere dense sets. This is a topological notion of degeneracy.
world): for any date t and division x, one can …nd a world in which it is almost common knowledge that the game is as in Rubinstein (1982) but the unique rationalizable outcome is that the players wait until date t to settle on x (Weinstein and Yildiz (2009)).
Conclusion
The common-prior assumption is a central assumption in modern economic theory and has led to spectacular advances in economics. It is also a central assumption in bargaining theory with similar success. Nevertheless, the common-prior assumption turns out to be quite restrictive both theoretically and empirically. In particular, empirical research suggests that it is violated systematically. For example, optimistic and self-serving biases have been reported frequently. Such biased beliefs are also commonly observed in the context of bargaining-even sometimes among the seasoned negotiator. Therefore, it is imperative that we examine the role of systematic biases and in particular optimism in bargaining. Moreover, given the large body of research in bargaining under common-prior, one would expect that the marginal value of new insights in the unexplored area of bargaining with systematic biases would be higher.
The role of optimism in bargaining has been recognized by practitioners for a long while, and bargaining delays and disagreements are often casually attributed to such excessive optimism. More careful game theoretical analysis reveals that in a general dynamic framework, optimism and systematic biases play a quite subtle role, showing that exploring the implications systematic biases requires more careful analysis. For example, Theorem 3 shows that excessive optimism alone cannot explain the bargaining delays alone, as there will be immediate agreement under persistent optimism. In addition to this insight, other research reviewed above reveals two further insights. First, when there is a …rm deadline in the near future, optimistic players will wait until the last minute before the deadline to settle, replicating the commonly observed behavior in real-life negotiations, a behavior that is called the deadline e¤ect. Second, when players do learn about their future bargaining power during the negotiations, the optimistic players have a strong incentive to wait in the hopes that the other players would learn and be persuaded to more reasonable terms. In that case, the agreement is delayed until the learning slows down. Several authors explored the implications of optimism in more applied and empirical models, generating valuable insights into those problems. These results raises the hope that we can …nd many other valuable insights into the bargaining behavior by exploring the role of systematic biases in bargaining carefully.
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